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Abstract 
 In this article first conventional definitions and the major traditional theories of self and identity are summarized.  Because 
immigrant identity is central to other processes they too are summarized.  They include the concepts of integration, assimilation, 
acculturation, adaptation, adjustment, and adoption.  It is important and useful to review the distinctions made between 
integration and assimilation as well as the distinctions between self and identity that exist in the conventional sociology and 
psychology literature.  Too often these concepts are confused or used as synonyms.   
 Then a final section presents a discussion of contemporary theories of immigrant identity specifically and the widely 
observed process of enclaving, which manifests in-group and out-group identification.  The theories of cultural fusion, semantic 
field theory, and dimensional accrual and dissociation are summarized and applied to the phenomenon of immigrant identity. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Immigrant 
 The English word “immigrate” is a verb.   “Immigrant” 
can be both a noun and an adjective.  These words share the 
root “migrate.”  In English they derive from the Latin  
immigr re , immigr t-, which means “to go into.”  We also 
have in-2 + migr re, meaning “to depart.”  The Indo-
European root of “migrate,” which has acceptations and 
adumbrations in many languages, not only English, is mei- 
1, which superficially means, “To change, go, move; with 
derivatives referring to the exchange of goods and services 
within a society as regulated by custom or law” (The 
American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, 
Fourth Edition, 2000).  English derivatives include mad, 
molt, mutate, mistake, and migrate.   
 From the Latin me re, which means to go, pass, we have 
the root of the English word “immigrant” meaning to 
permeate.  The suffixed o-grade form *moi-to-. Means to be 
mad, from Old English *gem    dan, to make insane or 
foolish, from Germanic *ga-maid-jan, denominative from 
*ga-maid-az, “changed (for the worse),” abnormal (*ga-, 
intensive prefix; see kom which instantiates communion, 
commune, and communication). 
 Like a liquid or gas, immigrants are mobile.  They 
penetrate, interpenetrate, pass a boundary and enter into a 
larger preexisting body.  They are not indigenous and as such 
they are foreign, often seen and defined as abnormal by the 
indigenous element.  They communicate strangely and may 
follow alien mores.  The emphasis on abnormal difference 
also appears in mew1, the root of molt, mutate, commute, 
permute, transmute, from Latin m t re, to change and the 
suffixed zero-grade form *mi-t - from Latin s mita, 
meaning sidetrack, side path (< “thing going off to the side”; 
s -, apart; see s(w)e-).  The suffixed extended zero-grade 
form *mit-to-. gives us mis-1, from Old English mis-, mis-, 
and Old French mes- (from Frankish *miss-); amiss, mistake, 
from Old Norse mis(s), mis(s)-, miss, mis-; c. miss1, from 
Old English missan, to miss, from Germanic *missjan, to go 
wrong. a–c all from Germanic *missa-, “in a changed 
manner,” abnormally, wrongly.  The unfamiliar behavior of 
the immigrant is often perceived as “wrong.” 
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 Meanwhile the immigrant may very well recognize the 
same mistakes she has made and be quite aware that she does 
not know all aspects of the host cultural ways but she 
attributes her mistakes to her lack of knowledge about the 
local environment.  The immigrant does not see herself as 
evil or malicious or stupid, just ignorant.  The immigrant will 
tend to attribute her mistakes to innocent ignorance, not to 
personal malice or disrespect for local folkways or to her 
own moral failing.  The difference the immigrant embodies 
may well be attributed by the host as an inherent failing of 
the immigrant.  For the immigrant it is not an inherent failing 
but a matter of innocent misunderstanding that can be 
ameliorated with time and experience.  Thus, attribution is 
in the eye of the beholder.  However we can learn what Jean 
Gebser (1949 Ger./1986 Eng.) calls an integral way of 
understanding which enables us to recognize both 
perspectives, make sense of each perspective, and work with 
them.     
As we find with so many ancient words opposites are very 
often signified by a single term thus, the suffixed o-grade 
form *moi-n- in compound adjective *ko-moin-i-, means to 
be “held in common” (*ko-, together; see kom), the common 
sense, the public form, the general demeanor or typical mode 
of communication.   
Attribution and Motive 
 Thus the immigrant makes mistakes.  A mistake means 
not conforming to the folkways of the host culture and not 
knowing the “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1973; 1983).  Such 
social clumsiness or cultural and linguistic illiteracy may be 
seen by the indigenous as unfamiliar, irreverent, and 
outlandishly exotic.  They may well see the immigrant as 
foolish, insane, unfit, off track, marginal, mistaken, 
immature, immoral, and so forth.  There are current writers 
such as William Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim (2003) 
who define the immigrant identity precisely in these 
ethnocentric terms (Kramer, 2008, 2003, 2000).  However, 
as attribution theory (Heider, 1958, Nisbett, 1980; 
Berscheid, et. al., 1983) would suggest there will be a large 
difference between the emic and etic perspectives on an 
immigrant’s overt behavior. 
 Borrowing from the linguistic meanings of phonetic and 
phonemic, Kenneth Pike (1967) coined two terms to identify 
how behavior is seen/evaluated and judged.  The emic 
perspective is the internal perspective of the actor, in this 
case the immigrant.  The etic perspective is the external 
observation of the immigrant’s behavior by local folk.  The 
emic perspective makes sense of the world in terms the 
social agent understands.  The etic makes sense of the world 
in terms observers understand as they observe the behavior 
of a person or group in question.   
 The host culture, with its etic perspective may see the 
immigrant as lacking in many competencies and even in 
moral character.  Ethnocentrism means more than simply 
observing obvious differences in lifestyle and mannerisms.  
It involves applying one’s personal values and moral 
judgments to that behavior.  Ethnocentrism is, therefore, a 
moral and ethical phenomenon.  The local folk may tend to 
blame mistakes on the character and personality traits of the 
newcomer, impugning the morality and ethical judgment of 
the stranger, suggesting that there is something inherently 
inferior, lazy, stupid, malicious, or malevolent about her.  
Given a lack of information they may well fall back on 
stereotypes and attribute the newcomer’s mistakes or odd 
behavior to the group to which she “belongs,” be it a racial 
or ethnic group, nationality, religious affiliation, level of 
educational attainment, even political party membership. 
 Host society receptivity is a measure of how welcoming 
a host society or group is to an outsider (Berry, 1997).  This 
factor is essential to the success of the newcomer.  Many 
researchers make untested presumptions about immigrant 
identity and host receptivity and the interaction between the 
two.  One presumption is that simple interaction between 
immigrants and their hosts will eventually lead to 
“assimilation” meaning that their cultural identity will 
follow a process of adaptation whereby the immigrant 
abandons their original culture, values, and ways of thinking 
and adopts the customs, values and social attributes of the 
host society until she becomes indistinguishable from a 
majority group member (Park, 1950; Gordon, 1964).  
According to William Park (1950), as interactions between 
ethnic groups sharing a common socio-cultural boundary 
increase their distinct ethnicities will disappear until the 
groups become culturally indistinguishable.  
 This presumption is unfounded.  And when one looks at 
the preservation of cultural identity over centuries among 
ethnic groups that live side-by-side throughout Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America and even among others as in the 
case of Jews, there is much evidence to contradict this claim 
(Simmel, 1908 Ger./1950 Eng.).  Already in 1963, Nathan 
Glazer and Donald Moynihan observed that while some 
immigrant groups assimilate others retain aspects of their 
native culture.  Assimilation is far more complex than Park 
suggested or even some writers admit.  Even today, and 
despite all the historical evidence amassed to the contrary by 
scholars such as Thomas Sowell (1995; 1996), some writers 
continue to repeat Park’s assertion made over half a century 
ago.  An example is Gudykunst and Kim (2003): “Thus 
adaptation occurs naturally regardless of the intentions of 
immigrants as long as they are functionally dependent on, 
and interacting with, the host sociocultural system” (p. 349).   
Another unfounded presumption made by the original 
students of immigration is that the host society presents a 
monolithic “mainstream” culture.  This is denied by the 
presence of modern multicultural societies such as the 
United States.  Due to the fact that the United States was 
founded as a colonial entity, that it remains a colonial 
destination by millions of people from all over the world, 
and that it is the largest colony in the history of the world, it 
is very multicultural.  Rural Nebraska is very different from 
San Diego, which is very different from Mobile, Alabama.  
And even within Mobile and San Diego you have 
neighborhood cultures.  Unfortunately this claim that an 
immigrant faces a singular and simple mainstream culture, 
which will guide their direction of assimilation is still 
prevalent in some writing.  As Anthony Pym (2003) 
following the work of Homi Bhabha (2004) puts it, culture 
is a product of codifying intercultures.  Like dialects and 
daughter languages, “All cultures stem from intercultures, 
which lose secondness as they expand” (Pym 2003, p. 4; also 
see Pym 2004). 
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 Another assumption made by the early scholars, and 
again, which is still repeated by a few current writers, is that 
the “direction” of change is unilateral based on the 
quantitative predominance of locals, which forms 
conformity pressure on the immigrant individual.  Repeating 
Park, some writers reiterate his claim that the “one-sided 
change is [caused] by the extent the dominant power of the 
host culture controls the daily survival and functions of 
strangers, it is present as coercive pressure on them to adapt” 
(Gudykunst and Kim, 2003, p. 360).  This false belief was 
already abandoned by the mid-1960’s in sociology and 
psychology, specifically in the work of Milton Gordon 
(1964) who is widely regarded as the next major figure to 
study immigration after Park a decade-and-a-half earlier.  
Gordon observed that the host culture can be greatly changed 
by the appearance of immigrants.   
Adjustment, Adaptation, Adoption, Conformity, 
Integration, Assimiliation, Acculturation   
 There is confusion in the use of concepts among some 
writers that needs to be addressed.  For instance, Gudykunst 
and Kim (2003) duplicate nearly everything Park said in 
1950 except that they confound the concepts he employed 
with great rigor.  They replace Park’s “adopt” with “adapt,” 
a liberal use of language that Park’s rigor would not allow.  
But in both cases (adopt and adapt) the conformity pressure 
put on immigrants by the host culture, is just that, not 
adaptation, which involves the emergence of a new form of 
living, but conformity to the status quo (Kramer, 2000; 
2003; 2009).  This pressure is real.  However, it affects 
different immigrants differently and in nearly all cases, at 
least some of their native culture is retained.   
 As we follow the evolution of the idea of immigrant 
identity and assimilation theory from Park to Gordon (1964) 
and beyond, the trajectory of the concepts adapt, adopt, 
adjust, assimilate, and integrate, sometimes become 
entangled and confused.  Gordon (1964) realized that the 
change that constitutes assimilation is on both sides of the 
equation, that the host culture is changed by the presence of 
immigrants just as they are changed by the host culture, a 
process Eric Kramer (2000a; 2000c; 2003a; 2009) calls co-
evolution, which also involves the co-constitution of 
identities (Kramer, 2009; 1993). 
 Park and Gordon were also very careful to distinguish 
between assimilation and integration for integration 
presumes that cultural differences between the host and the 
migrant will endure so that there is something to integrate.  
While assimilation leads to the disappearance of the 
immigrant culture and the ethnic identity of a person in a 
process of socio-cultural homogenization, integration 
involves the continued vitality of immigrant identity as such.  
They are mutually exclusive processes.  Assimilation means 
the end of integration for integration requires difference.  
Gordon (1964) updated Park’s work noting that assimilation 
is a multidimensional process and that the change wrought 
by immigration effects everyone involved including the host 
society. 
                                                          
1 This table of the stages of culture shock and 
acculturation is a synthesis of many descriptions 
 Some writers who borrow in whole and part the 
Park/Gordon notion of cultural adapatation/assimiliation fail 
to be clear about the difference between assimilation and 
integration.  For example, Gudykunst and Kim (2003) 
completely confuse the four concepts of assimilation, 
integration, adoption, and adaptation, using them 
interchangeably.  As Gudykunst and Kim (2003) put it, 
“total assimilation,” which is a “lifelong goal” and equal to 
perfect mental health according to them, constitutes, “the 
highest degree of adaptation conceivable” (p. 360).  They 
also borrow Park’s notion that assimilation is a progressive 
linear process.  But they fail to follow his rigor as he breaks 
down the process into a discontinuous extension of phases 
of assimilation, an attempt to offer a taxonomy of 
assimilation that progresses in stages (Winklman, 1994).     
Stages of Culture Shock: 
1)  Contact-Fascination-Honeymoon Stage  
Characteristics: excitement, insomnia, positive expectations, 
an idealized view of the host culture.  In this initial stage of 
cultural adjustment anxiety and stress are typically 
interpreted positively.  
2) Disintegration-Hostility-Crises-Culture Shock Stage  
This stage usually manifests within a few months of arrival. 
It is characterized by irritability, pre-occupations with 
cleanliness, safety, a devaluation of the host culture.  
Commonly multiple physical/psychological problems 
related to cortisol-mediated stress response manifest. 
Symptoms include anxiety, agitation, panic, conversion-
hysteria, anger, aggression, poor concentration, restless 
sleep, low energy, a decline in appetite, loneliness, and even 
suicidal tendencies.   
3) Reintegration-Acceptance-Reorientation-Gradual 
Recovery Stage  
In order to be able to function effectively, there must be 
some adaptation to the new cultural environment.  Without 
adaptation, the newcomer either seeks to escape or 
withdrawal (“flight or isolation”).  This stage entails 
accommodating to the new rules, roles and behaviors of the 
host country.  Adaptations will require problem solving, and 
gaining new perspectives on one’s own culture and the new 
host culture.  Essential to this process is the adoption of an 
empathetic attitude and a suspension of judgment toward the 
host society.  Problems and stressors do not end in this stage.  
4) Adaptation-Resolution-Acculturation-Autonomy Stage  
One is able to develop stable adaptations that are successful 
at resolving new and current problems.  One gains an 
awareness of cultural similarities and differences with their 
own. The host cultural ways become normalized in one’s 
mind.  The newcomer accepts the new culture without 
idealization or devaluation1. 
 In 1997 the Canadian social-psychologist John Berry 
(1997), set out to clarify the concept of acculturation, a 
process that takes two fundamentally different paths; 
assimilation and integration.  As noted, these are mutually 
exclusive processes for assimilation spells the end of 
integration -- the end of the immigrant identity, way of 
behaving, thinking, and feeling.  While a few writers such as 
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) still adhere to the idea that a 
including Park (1950), Gordon (1964), and 
Winkleman (1994). 
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“functionally fit” immigrant is one who willfully “unlearns” 
or “deculturizes” herself via “psychic disintegration” in 
order to conform to the host society’s “mainstream” versions 
of appropriate behavior patterns, cognitive patterns, and 
affect patterns, Berry (1997) and Kramer (2009; 2000b; 
2002; 2003a, 2003b) note that such attempts to impose 
assimilation often lead to resistance and social conflict.  
Immigrants themselves prefer to integrate and this is also 
most likely the “natural” path given the nature of 
hermeneutic horizons and cultural fusion (Kramer, 2003; 
2009).  One cannot learn anything new except by making 
sense of it from one’s perspective, which is always already 
operant.  That perspective is one’s hermeneutic horizon and 
interaction involves the fusion of two or more horizons.   
 Berry (1997) has identified four mutually exclusive 
acculturation strategies. These four strategies are: 
assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization. 
Berry accepts Park’s definition of assimilation whereby the 
immigrant eventually disappears.  Integration, according to 
Berry is the process by which the immigrant, or immigrant 
group, becomes an active member of the host society, yet 
simultaneously maintains a distinct ethnic identity.  
Separation occurs when ethnic minorities refuse or are 
refused by the host society to become active participants in 
that larger society.  The host society may see their culture as 
fundamentally incompatible and therefore the immigrant is 
not “assimilable.”  In such a case the host society may 
attempt to bar their entry while welcoming more compatible 
immigrants.  An example of this was the passage of the 
Chinese Exclusionary Act of 1882 in the United States.  
After helping to build the transcontinental railroad, Chinese 
were excluded from further immigration by an act of the 
United States Congress.  At the same time the United States 
government welcomed more and more immigrants who were 
seen as more culturally compatible from Europe.  Finally, 
marginalization, as defined by Berry, is what many 
contemporary writers such as Edward Said (2002) 
incorrectly call diaspora.  Many peoples have found 
themselves displaced and unable to “go home” (Cohen, 
1997).   
 Diaspora, a term taken from the Christian Old Testament, 
means to be scattered across the earth, homeless.  The first 
use of the word is in Deuteronomy 28:25, referring to the 
“wandering Jews”: “thou shalt be a dispersion in all 
kingdoms of the earth.”  Marginalization is different.  In 
some ways it is worse because the ancient Jews never lost 
their sense of who they were.  Marginalization, as defined by 
Berry (1997) occurs in migrants when they neither identify 
with their original cultural home, nor with that of the host 
society (Berry, 1997).  This is common among immigrants 
in the modern world where change is great and swift so that 
after an extended stay of many years in an adopted home 
country, when they return to their original home, they find 
that it is “gone.”  It has changed so much that they no longer 
feel like they belong.  The diasporic condition means that a 
person feels as though she no longer belongs as a full citizen 
and cultural participant in either her new adopted country 
nor in her old homeland.   
 
The Common Sense 
 The immigrant, newcomer, sojourner, does not share the 
common sense (Gadamer, 1960 Ger./2006 Eng.), the folk 
knowledge presupposed by the indigenous population.  Part 
of intercultural adjustment means to begin to inhabit that 
common sense.  As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960 Ger./2006 
Eng.) notes, the common sense is the sense or mode of 
meaning that permeates a worldview, which seems natural, 
obvious, logical, and rational.  It is the basis of the “realism” 
of a worldview for those who live within that hermeneutic 
horizon.   
 For example, if I live long enough among the Mosquito 
Indians of Central America, I may begin to not merely 
appreciate how the world for them is infused with a spiritual 
dimension but I may actually begin to inhabit that 
worldview, it may take me over and I may become 
“superstitious” myself and begin to make sense of the world 
that way and come to “see” that illness may be caused by a 
curse.  As the common sense of the Mosquito Indian 
Lebenswelt (lifeworld which is not worldview for the latter 
suggests that we know that our reality is merely a 
perspective) increasingly comes to be the way I make sense 
of things, their behaviors, values, beliefs and attitudes will 
become more and more logical to me.  If you believe that 
making eye contact with the image of a person reflected in a 
mirror suspended over water will compel that person to fall 
in love with you, then you will logically, rationally, either 
seek to make eye contact or to avoid it, depending on your 
desire.   
 Communities are bound by the common sense they share, 
the way they make sense of the cosmos, what it means to 
them, which includes their sense of self, their place.  One can 
arrogantly refuse to take another’s way of being in the world 
seriously because it seems “primitive,” “backward,” 
“ignorant,” but if you want to understand why people do 
what they do, you have to understand the world from their 
perspective.  That does not mean you have to presume it as 
true, but in order to understand them, you have to at least 
take their lifeworld into account.   
 As Edmund Husserl (1913 Ger./1982 Eng.) and Kenneth 
Burke (1945) agreed, in the case of human behavior, motive 
is more important than material causation.  And motivation 
always involves judgment.  Studies have shown, for 
instance, that whether people want to or not, they judge 
whether a face is pretty or ugly within two seconds of seeing 
it.  And this judgment has profound implications for the 
interpersonal interactions that follow.    
 Those who attempt to reduce culture to mere material 
conditions, such as Marvin Harris (1979), fail to understand 
the semantic field that human beings inhabit (Kramer, 1997).  
For instance poverty, bitterness, and resentment cannot be 
reduced to material possession for if that were so, monks, 
priests, lamas, and many others would not feel “rich” and 
fulfilled despite their relative paucity of material 
possessions.  One should be able to rank order nations in 
terms of happiness just as easily as one can measure per 
capita income.  Also, materialism as an explanation for 
human behavior ultimately can lead to genetic pre-
determinism and that in turn can logically lead to eugenics.  
It implies that people are as they are due to inherent and 
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immutable properties rooted in their material biology.  If that 
were so, then every time I eat something and my brain 
chemistry changes, mathematics should change.  But it does 
not.  The laws of noncontradiction, monus ponendo ponens, 
monus tollens, and the like apply both before and after lunch, 
for as Husserl noted, mathematics, logic, and all the rest of 
human cultural existence transcends my own direct personal 
observations and my own physical, contingent body.  They 
exist as systems of symbolic interaction.  Testing, a system 
of logic that has no color or weight proves that eyewitness 
accounts are notoriously fallible.   
 Reducing human existence to materialism can lead to the 
kind of justification one finds for caste systems around the 
world and as such it is quite at odds with meritocracy and the 
mountain of empirical evidence that demonstrate that 
genetics do not determine behavior. 
 Too often people confuse materialism with empiricism 
and then argue that these modes of awareness are the 
necessary conditions for doing science.  All animals function 
fundamentally by using sensory input.  A hamster is 
empirical in that he finds his way around via sensory 
information.  Alchemists and many others through history 
have made a discipline of careful observation and systematic 
notation.  But science takes empirical observations and adds 
something that is not empirical, mathematical logic.  One 
cannot derive science from simple materialism.  I point this 
out because Harris and others often argue that their 
materialism is justified because they want to do a true 
science of culture.   
 Furthermore, many such efforts at simple reductionism 
involve type 1 and type 2 inference errors whereby causation 
is either mistakenly reversed or mistakenly presumed.  
Racism is a classic example.  The fact that night and day are 
highly correlated does not mean that one causes the other.  
Correlations of material events are not explanations.  
Materialism as a theory is not only not self-evident but also 
not meaningful.  Human beings always already interpret 
material conditions.  That is why two groups faced with 
basically identical material conditions come up with very 
different solutions and ways of living.  The lowest common 
material denominators such as a need for shelter and food 
are what Clifford Geertz (1973) calls “banal generalities,” 
that utterly miss and fail to explain the great cultural 
diversity we see.  It also fails utterly to explain why life 
forms have proliferated far beyond the single-celled 
organism, which proved early on to be so fantastically 
successful.  
 So if we accept Husserl’s and Burke’s claims that 
motivation is more important to understanding and 
subsequently explaining human behavior than brute material 
causation, then we must examine motivation. Abraham 
Maslow agreed and set out to try to do just that.  He famously 
offered a hierarchy of needs that he believed explained 
motivation.  However, he bemoaned the fact that writers 
refused to read his work and properly, honestly cite him 
(Maslow, 1968).  Maslow discussed the human needs for 
esteem and self-transcendence and he also says very clearly 
in his influential magnum opus Motivation and Personality 
(1954) that a simple hierarchy cannot explain phenomena 
such as aesthetics and other aspects that are so essential to 
choices, behaviors and judgmental comparisons of cultural 
expressions.  People will starve, fight, and steal for art.  He 
understood this.  People will voluntarily undergo physical 
hardships in order to build cathedrals and pyramids. Clashes 
of culture can be rarely reduced to physical needs, on one 
hand, or self-actualization on the other.     
 If cultural materialism were an adequate explanation for 
human behavior then we could simply say that the richer a 
society, the happier it must be, but that is not so.  And as the 
first scientific work in social studies demonstrated, suicide 
is most prevalent among the richest industrialized nations, 
not “poor” agrarian ones or Neolithic villagers (Durkheim, 
1897 Fr./1997 Eng.).     
 Emmanuel Levinas (1961 Ger./1969 Eng.) notes that 
many physical structures can protect a person from the 
weather but only one is “home.”  The qualitative difference 
is profound and leads to many behaviors that make no sense 
unless you take this fact into account.  For the immigrant, the 
host culture may afford shelter, even a more luxurious 
version of it, but it is not home until they fuse horizons with 
it, as Gadamer says (1960 Ger./2006 Eng.).  Identification is 
a one-dimensional, largely emotional relationship with a 
person, object, group, or place (Gebser, 1949 Ger./1986 
Eng.).           
 The status of being an immigrant means one who crosses 
boundaries between groups, which usually means crossing 
from one common sense ecology into a different lifeworld.  
What we have then is a status, an identification of a person 
who is on the move between groups.  It is also a mood, a 
state of mind, a set of mannerisms and an expressed custom 
that is not merely contingent but has serious moral 
implications.  From the German gemütlichkeit we have the 
sensibility of congeniality. Often immigrants try their best to 
get along with the indigenous ways they encounter even if 
they do not understand.  They may make mistakes and 
misinterpretations and harbor different values, but they 
typically try to get along.  It is not in their interest to conflict 
with the local folk. 
Culture and Identity 
Before continuing on with a very specific discussion of 
immigrant identity, it is important to summarize the 
conventional use of the concepts “culture,” “identity,” and 
“self” that constitutes the social scientific tradition.   
 
Who Am “I?” 
 In my country I am regarded as a great hero who resisted 
the domination of invaders and who was tragically captured 
and hung but who inspired my people to unify and liberate 
my land.  All my countrymen, even today, know my name.  
Do you know me?  My name is Васил Левски.  Many know 
me as Vasil Levski.  I am Bulgaria.  
 In my explorations I walked, canoed and snow-shoed 
nearly 40,000 miles and surveyed over one million square 
miles of my country, ten times as much as the United States 
explorers Lewis and Clark did in their country.  All my 
countrymen know me even today.  For 20 years I explored 
the second largest country on Earth, Canada.  Do you know 
me?  My name is David Thompson.   
 One thing communities share are attachments to iconic 
personalities that are often identified with the founding of 
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their own national identities.  Often the difference between 
groups starts with such iconic identification and sense of 
origin. Ancient Greek city-states such as Argos were 
founded by eponymous heroes.  Each citizen regarded 
himself as a direct descendant of the legendary founder.  
Qualities the people want to believe they have are embodied 
in their legendary founders.  Rome was founded by and 
named after Romulus, the United States too has its semi-
sacred founders whose names and exploits are taught to its 
children and which naturalized citizens must learn and be 
tested on before being granted citizenship.  For instance, one 
question is: What is the name of the ship that brought the 
pilgrims to America? A) the Constitution, B) the Mayflower, 
C) the Titanic. Nearly all United States citizens know the 
name and story of the Mayflower, but someone from 
Kyrgzstan very well may not.  But the Kyrgyz people know 
all about, take pride in, and identify with Manas, the hero in 
an epic tale twenty times longer than Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey combined, a poem regularly recited at festivals by 
men held in high esteem called Manaschis.   
 If a person does not know such common knowledge, then 
that person may well be seen by the community as not 
belonging, as not knowing who they are. 
Importance of the Self 
 Multicultural understanding begins with an 
understanding of the self.  The ability to perceive (including 
cultural perception) all starts with and is dependent on the 
self.  The self is distinguished from identity and 
consciousness.  None of these aspects of a person is 
regarded as a fixed object among other fixed objects.  
Instead, each is in constant flux.  Primarily an exterior 
phenomenon, identity emerges as dependent on how others 
see us.  It is the most superficial of the three and the most 
easily changed.  Self is much more complex.  It is not as 
“social” as identity.  Nonetheless, self is a cultural construct.  
The self is the domain of beliefs, values, attitudes, wants, and 
needs.   
 The self has a core of beliefs and attitudes that are very 
unlikely to change after adulthood.  While these terms will 
be defined further on, it may help to begin with basic 
definitions.  Beliefs describe what each individual holds to 
be “true,” from the most mundane (e.g., “It’s Tuesday”) to 
the most sublime (e.g., “There is no God but Allah, and 
Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah”).  Values describe what 
is held to be right (e.g., “Self-Sacrifice for one’s country is 
noble,” and wrong (e.g., “Thou shalt not lie”).  Attitudes 
describe sets of preconceived notions toward or against some 
object (e.g., “I like rollercoasters”).  Wants describe the 
states of being or material things desired by a person but not 
required for survival.  Those things one must have in order 
to survive are needs.  Consciousness is the ability to have 
awareness.   
 The claim that a person has a set of core values and many 
superficial beliefs that are constantly changing is an essential 
concept to the overall theory of cultural fusion (Kramer, 
1997, 2000, 2002).   
 Several scholars of symbolic interactionism have argued 
that the “self” is a complex system (Schutz, 1970; Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966; Harre, 1979; Mead, 1934; Cooley, 
1902: Blumer, 1969; Becker, 1953; Hickman and Kuhn, 
1956).  Symbolic interactionists agree on five basic tenets.   
 First, that meaning is a product of social life. 
 Second, society is a network of social interactions 
in which participants assign meaning to their own 
and others’ actions.   
 Third, individuals are actors and not just reactors, 
which means that people initiate social behavior.   
 Fourth, a person plays many different roles or has 
many different “selves,” which has led to the 
dramatistic school of social behavior analysis 
(Burke, 1945, 1966; Gergen, 1985; Delia, 1987; 
Goffman, 1974; Bormann, 1980).   
 Fifth, the self has at least two dimensions 
designated by the “I” and the “me” (Mead, 1934).   
 For George Herbert Mead the “I” is the impulsive part of 
the person while the “me” is a reflection of how others 
generally see one.  In many ways, Mead’s idea of the “I” is 
similar to Sigmund Freud’s notion of the id, and Mead’s 
“me” is like Freud’s superego (Freud, 1923).  Mead’s “I” is 
impulsive and the “me” must control the “I’s” energy.   
 The concept of self is somewhat similar to Mead’s “I,” 
while identity has some similarity to Mead’s “me.”  But 
neither the self nor identity is fixed.  In terms of 
intersubjective (social) interaction, identity is a consequence 
of context.  You have many identities and identity is based 
on how others see and react to you.  Unlike Mead’s 
generalized other, others are not generalized, such that we 
have more than one “other” and therefore more than one 
“me” or identity.  You are not in control of your own 
identities.  How others react to you involves many factors 
that you cannot control.  The phrase “I am...” is indicative of 
identification.  I am an employee of Coca Cola.  I am 
Japanese.  I am a sports team member.  I am a woman.  I am 
a student.  I am a son.  I am happy.  I am smart.  I am sick, 
et cetera.   
 There are two kinds of characteristics that constitute the 
self, which in turn signifies in-group and out-group 
membership.  They are primary and secondary 
characteristics.  Primary characteristics are ones that cannot 
be changed or transferred, such as race, (in most cases) sex, 
and age.  Secondary characteristics are ones that can be 
changed, such as (in most cases) religion or nationality. 
 Core of the Self. “I am...” is a statement of identity and 
it can also signify the self.  But the statement “I am...” 
involves beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, and needs.  A 
belief is an assertion that is perceived to be true.  Beliefs are 
not necessarily facts in the objective sense, because we often 
believe things that are not objectively true.  An attitude is a 
more generalized cognition.  Attitudes are different from 
beliefs in that attitudes have three dimensions, which are: an 
evaluative component (good versus evil); a belief 
component (true versus false); and a behavioral component.  
Attitudes are typically learned and are therefore relatively 
enduring.  Attitudes are usually learned from watching the 
reactions of others to situations and events.  Values are 
generalized evaluations of right and wrong and are usually 
learned from our culture and are used to judge the behavior 
of ourselves and others.  One may have an overall good 
attitude regarding a friend and that can create a “halo effect” 
or attribution that makes you see even her “bad behavior” as 
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not so bad as it would seem if done by a stranger or a person 
with a negative halo.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relative Depth of Evaluative Dimensions 
 Values. Values go beyond human interrelations and 
include the land and animals.  For instance, the Maori of 
New Zealand hold very strong feelings about the inheritance 
of land.  Among the Navaho, matrilineal kinship rules give 
women their own plots of land (Dodd, 1998).  For many 
plains natives of North America, the land is conceived as the 
Earth Mother.  With regards to the relationship between 
humans and animals, again cultural values, which are also 
personal values, vary greatly. The Kwakuutl of Vancouver 
Island claim animals to be their ancestors while the Balinese 
do not regard animals as being at all human-like and are 
repulsed by “animal-like” behavior.   
 As a value, friendship is valued in every culture but 
differs in many respects from one culture to another.  For 
instance, among Euro-Americans in North America friends 
are quickly made and abandoned.  The level of personal 
obligation between friends is relatively low.  But among 
Native Americans such as the Kiowa, it takes a long time to 
move from the status of an acquaintance to that of a friend, 
and friendship is a lifelong relationship and it means sharing 
at a very intimate level with much obligation.  
 Attitudes. An attitude is a generalized favorable or 
unfavorable evaluation of some object or behavior.  
Attitudes are relatively enduring because we seek cognitive 
consistency.  That is why it is hard for us to see friends as 
doing bad things or as being bad people.  A friend, for whom 
we have a positive attitude, is seen as a good person who did 
a bad thing.  A belief is an assertion that we perceive to be 
true.  Beliefs differ from attitudes in that beliefs are more 
specific.  Attitudes are closely related to beliefs.  For 
instance a positive attitude about someone or something will 
lead to the belief that that thing or person is truly good.  
Attitudes are the foundations upon which specific beliefs 
rest.  For instance, if I have a negative attitude toward racism 
then it is likely that I will not support specific behaviors like 
racial segregation or slavery. Knowing a person’s beliefs can 
be clues to their more general attitudes.   
 Edward Steele and Charles Redding (1961) conducted 
surveys of North American values.  They found that North 
Americans generally value individuality, achievement and 
success, progress, effort and optimism, equality, efficiency, 
humor, generosity, competition, and quantification.  In parts 
of Africa, in particular with the Ashanti, and in Asia (e.g., 
the Chinese), respect for ancestors is a deeply held value.  
Other than the veneration Americans feel toward the 
“Founding Fathers,” this value is generally not found in the 
United States, certainly not to the extent of performing 
ancestor worship. The same is true concerning respect for 
elders.   
 By contrast, dishonesty perpetrated on another member 
of the group does not seem to be a value in any culture.  
However, cleverness in business is, as in the Middle East, 
and while bribery is perceived as dishonest in some cultures 
such as Germany, it is viewed as a courtesy and payment for 
favor in others such as Mexico.  Indeed, the fancy business 
lunches and small gifts most American businesspeople (and 
tax collectors) would consider bribery are commonplace in 
Irish commerce (Levy, 2000).   
 Beliefs. Milton Rokeach (1968) argues that our belief 
systems have five different levels.  He uses an onion as a 
metaphor for explaining belief system.  This metaphor has 
two important implications.  First some beliefs, the ones on 
the outer skin of the onion, are easily changed while the 
deeper layers at the core of the onion constitute our most 
powerfully held beliefs.  Second the outer layer beliefs are 
dependent on the deeper ones.  If a core belief changes, like 
belief in a god, all the outer layer beliefs will be affected.  
But if a weakly held belief on the outer skin changes like I 
decide that my favorite color is not red but blue, this has no 
effect on the deeper structures of beliefs.   
 Rokeach outlines the five layers of the onion stating that 
the outer-most layer is the one of “inconsequential beliefs.”  
Inconsequential beliefs concern personal tastes such as “I 
hate pizza,” or “I like sushi.”  The next layer into the onion 
is that of “derived beliefs.”  Derived beliefs come from 
authorities in one’s life such as the news media, teachers, 
and/or religious leaders.  Derived beliefs come to us more 
subtly and are much longer lasting than inconsequential 
beliefs.  The next layer is called “authority beliefs.”  These 
are more specific and concern whom you can and cannot 
trust. Authority beliefs dictate that I should trust my parents 
more than a stranger. 
The two layers that comprise the inner core of beliefs are 
the “primitive without consensus beliefs” and the 
“primitive with consensus beliefs.”  These two together 
constitute the core values of your cultural self.   
Core Values of the Cultural Self 
Primitive Without Consensus 
Primitive With Consensus 
Figure 2. Core Values and Cultural Self 
  
 Primitive without consensus beliefs are often called 
“ideological.”  They are doctrines that guide your life but 
you realize that there are some people who do not share them 
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with you.  This would involve your religious faith, your 
political party allegiance, and so forth.  The absolute core of 
your belief system, the primitive with consensus beliefs, is 
constituted of beliefs that are indisputable to you such as “I 
am a student,”  “I need air to live.”    
 Values and needs also form hierarchies of importance 
and help to identify who we are (Maslow, 1968).  They are 
transmitted to us by authority figures from our childhood 
such as parents, teachers, and religious leaders.  Our most 
deeply held values are generally those of our culture.  In fact, 
culture can be seen as a complex of shared behaviors, 
values and beliefs and derivative motives, expectations, and 
behavior patterns.   Values are expressed as evaluations of 
people, things and events.  An example would be that 
Japanese are better than Nigerians.  Or that Thai food is not 
as good as Italian food.  Evaluations of right and wrong, 
good and bad are at the core of cultural selves and are also 
the source of ethnocentrism.  Ethnocentrism is more than 
just the recognition of difference.  It is the evaluation of that 
difference first into normal and abnormal, which often 
becomes good and bad or right and wrong, and then more 
disputable beliefs and judgments.  It is true that many people 
from Africa have dark skin.  This is a widely shared belief.  
But to then say that dark skin is abnormal or bad is a value 
judgment.   
 In this sense the self and culture cannot be separated.  
The core beliefs and values of a person come from their 
culture via socialization from childhood (Brislin, 1993).  
Becoming a member of a society and culture involves the 
formation of self.  Bronislaw Malinowski (1961) studied the 
Trobriand islanders.  From this experience, Malinowski 
concluded that cultural systems, including values, are 
organized around three categories of underlying needs.  
Basic needs are those related to survival such as food and 
water.  Derived needs are those associated with social 
coordination such as divisions of labor and resource 
distribution.  Finally integrative needs are those needs for 
social harmony and security, which give rise to cultural 
expressions like magic, myth, and art (Nanda, 1980). 
 However, not all cultures conceive of the self in the same 
way.  For instance, according to Rom Harré (1983), for the 
Innuit (Eskimos) the self is seen as a part of a social network.  
Although Innuit people, like everyone else, have private 
feelings and opinions these are generally considered 
unimportant.  Important issues regarding the self are 
discussed in terms of qualities of relationships with others.  
For the Innuit, emotions are regarded as public displays 
instead of private feelings.  Emotions are expressed as a 
group so they all laugh together and cry together.  Innuit 
virtues are all social in nature.  Probably due to the harsh 
environmental climate within which they live, survival of the 
individual depends on survival of the group, which requires 
a great deal of social cooperation.  Furthermore, Innuit do 
not have a sense of individual creativity.  In Innuit art, artists 
believe that they are not creating something that does not 
already exist but instead that they are merely releasing that 
which is already present in the wood or ivory they carve.   
 According to Harré, the intensity and force of one’s 
personal powers depends on one’s self-concept.  In Western 
and Westernized modern industrial culture people see 
themselves as individual units, as singular and independent 
wholes.  By contrast, the Javanese perceive and conceive 
themselves as having two distinct parts, an inside of feelings 
and an outside of observed behaviors.  Moroccans have a 
different self-concept.  They tend to see themselves and 
others as embodiments of places and situations.  For 
Moroccans the identity of an individual is always a 
manifestation of situation, the self is a situational product.   
 Emotions. Some cultures allow one to express emotions 
more than others.  People of Anglo-Saxon descent tend to 
treat emotions as if they just happen to them and are internal 
phenomena.  For such people, emotions are privately 
manifested and individually realized.  Emotions are seen as 
passive (i.e., the “stiff upper lip”).  But many persons of 
Southern European culture see emotions as public, 
collective, and active.  Emotions for Southern Europeans -- 
for people from Spain, Italy, and Greece -- are frequently 
believed or assumed to be created by the group and are 
displayed in social situations.   
 While Harré has suggested that emotions are constructed 
concepts, James Averill (1980) has argued that in fact 
emotions are social constructs, which express cultural 
variance.  For Averill emotions are belief systems that define 
situations for group members.  Emotions consist of 
internalized norms that are the result of enculturation.  
According to Averill emotions are syndromes.   
A syndrome is a cluster of responses that go together.  
Combining and labeling feelings is a learned part of culture.  
The ability to make sense of emotions is socially 
constructed.  Emotional syndromes are learned through 
interaction with others.  We learn what a cluster of behaviors 
means and how to perform particular emotions in an 
appropriate way through socialization.  Emotions are acted 
out in specific ways and these ways of behaving and 
displaying emotion vary across cultures.   
 For example, what should grief look like?  It depends on 
the culture.  For people of Northern European culture, 
emotions tend to be suppressed and muted.  The 
aforementioned Anglo-Saxon “stiff upper lip” is an example.  
There is a joke that Finnish people tell about themselves 
which goes:  “There was once a Finn that loved his wife so 
much that he almost told her.”  Grief in many cultures is 
publicly and collectively expressed.  For instance, in 
Mediterranean countries and the Middle East, there even 
exist professional mourners, women who make a living 
going to funerals and wailing very prominently, loudly, and 
conspicuously.  In Japan, great shows of emotion are not 
appropriate.  One’s feelings and information about one’s self 
are relatively muted.  If you were to watch a traditional sumo 
wrestling match, you could hardly tell by the look on the 
contestants’ faces who won and who lost because such 
displays of emotion are strongly discouraged. 
 The inappropriate display of emotion is a major mistake 
in people’s intercultural communication.  Often the way an 
immigrant displays emotion is evaluated by the indigenous 
folk as inappropriate and even as proof that they are not 
merely deviant but morally inadequate.  Showing too much 
or too little emotion or the wrong kind can disrupt 
intercultural relations greatly.   
 According to Averill, there are four kinds of learned rules 
that govern emotional behavior.  First are “rules of 
appraisal.”  These rules guide the person as to what an 
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emotion is, whether it is positive or negative, and how it is 
directed.  Second are “rules of behavior,” which determine 
how to respond to a feeling.  Third are “rules of prognosis.” 
These rules define the progression and course of emotions.  
Finally, rules of attribution dictate how or if an emotion 
needs to be explained or justified.  
AVERILL’S FOUR EMOTIONAL RULES 
Appraisal Guides to what an emotion is 
Behavioral Guides how to respond to a feeling 
Prognosis Defines progression and course of 
emotions 
Attribution How and if an emotion should be explained 
or justified 
 For instance, each culture teaches its members how to 
appraise anger.  One is taught what he or she is feeling and 
how to target or direct anger.  We are taught how to define 
whether the anger experienced is positive like righteous 
indignation or negative like destructive and unfounded rage.  
Behavioral rules tell us how to express anger, whether it is 
appropriate to lash out or to keep quiet, to confront the target 
of our anger and aggress or to avoid them, to retreat.  
Prognosis rules dictate how long it is socially appropriate to 
be angry and for which kinds of offense.  Finally, 
attribution rules guide what excuses or reasons are 
adequate for provoking acceptable anger and whether or not 
these reasons need to be publicly explained (e.g., “He stole 
my favorite hunting knife which made me mad”).   
 Some cultures teach very linear causality in their 
attributions.  For instance, in the United States, Euro-
Americans tend to say that outside forces or another’s 
actions “made me angry.”  But for Eastern Europeans, anger 
can be a characteristic of the individual such that they may 
say that, “so-and-so has a mean heart.”  In such cases, anger 
is an inherent quality of an individual’s character and there 
need not be an external cause to provoke the emotional 
display in such a person.  Eastern Europeans observe that 
some people display a kind of inherent meanness when they 
are intoxicated while others consistently display an irrational 
euphoria when they are intoxicated.  The difference is not in 
the alcohol but in the person’s nature.  According to this 
cultural interpretation, being mean is neither caused by the 
individual nor by society.  It is simply the way the person is, 
despite their own best wishes; it is fate.   
 By contrast, in the United States, it is presumed that all 
people are basically happy by nature and that if they become 
angry it is due to an outside stimulus and/or force that makes 
them that way, perhaps faulty brain chemistry.  Anger is 
even treated as a disease such that if one can take away the 
stimulus or change the brain chemistry that causes anger or 
rage, then the anger and rage will be “solved” or “cured.”   
 Such differences are clues that reveal deeper cultural 
differences about so-called “human nature.”  In the United 
States, there is a kind of presumed equality, which supposes 
that basically everyone is the same but that they have 
different experiences.  Few other cultures hold this belief 
about human nature.  Instead they see individuals as having 
unique natures that are often expressed in their moods and 
behaviors, their personalities; and individuals in such 
cultures such as many Native American tribes are often 
named in accordance with their unique qualities.  This may 
explain why Euro-American medical practices are highly 
standardized while in much of the rest of the world such as 
in China, intimate knowledge of the individual dictates how 
to proceed in treatment.  Chinese medicine presents a 
dazzling array of discrete treatments that seem unsystematic 
by Euro-American standards.  This is because medications 
and treatments are often customized to fit each individual.     
 In some cultures emotion is seen as an expression of a 
collective feeling while in others it is seen as an expression 
of an individual’s feelings.  Music is universal and music is 
one of the ways emotion is allowed to be expressed even in 
cultures such as Japan where emotions are typically 
repressed.  Thus, karaoke allows the Japanese “salaryman” 
(office worker) to express himself in a fashion that would 
never be acceptable on the job.   
Characteristics of the Self 
 Primary characteristics are personal characteristics 
that are not transferable.  For instance, if we call a doctor for 
an emergency and she arrives and must identify who is 
injured, you raise your hand and say, “I am the one who has 
been hurt.”  At that instant you become “the patient.”  “You” 
are identical with the status “patient,” and it cannot be 
transferred to another arbitrarily.  In other words, you cannot 
give your injury to another.  Likewise, when you say that 
you are “Chinese” you may share this identity with millions 
of others but you cannot give this identity to a person from 
Sweden.  Nor can you lose your Chinese-ness.  This is an 
example of core or primary identity.  You speak Chinese.  
You cannot give that ability away any more than you can 
give away your skin color.  If a typical Euro-American wants 
to speak Chinese, the American must learn it.  Similarly you 
may learn several languages so that your linguistic 
community identity becomes expands.  “You” change but 
only through addition.  You may change roles and functions 
within a social structure but you do not change your primary 
cultural identity.  According to the conventional view of 
social-psychology, genuine cultural change occurs only 
when core values change. 
 Behavior is not identical with identity.  The behavioral 
fulfillment of a role is not the same as one’s culture.  Thus, 
a Japanese person may come to the United States and ride a 
horse but that does not make him a “cowboy,” nor does it 
make him any less Japanese.  However, you can become 
more complex and enriched by learning from other cultures.  
Learning is not a zero-sum game.  In other words, in order 
to learn about another kind of cuisine or music you do not 
have to forget the food and music you have known and liked 
before.  Becoming enriched and multicultural means 
learning and developing a variety of styles and indexes of 
knowledge, repertoires of accents, ways of looking at things, 
appreciating them, learning how to listen to foreign music 
and taste foreign foods; knowing about them and learning 
how to learn about them. 
 Secondary characteristics of self are those that are 
transferable.  This includes citizenship, job title, club 
memberships and the like.  Secondary identity often involves 
achievement rather than ascription (Parsons and Shils, 
1951).  One achieves a role through free will.  I run for 
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election of my student body and they elect me president.  In 
that capacity I have obligations, responsibilities, and 
privileges that I did not have before.  And after my term is 
finished I lose those same responsibilities and privileges.  
They pass on to the next president.  This is a quality of roles 
and functions within a structured environment (Parsons, 
1951; 1960).  This is very different from ascription such as 
being born into royalty or into a particular caste as in India.  
In ascriptive cultures you are your status.  It is not surprising, 
then, that these cultures tend to use titles more extensively 
and have a higher respect for organizational and social 
hierarchies (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).  
 Very often how a person dresses, what they purchase, 
and how they behave reflects the status they wish to have 
rather than what they actually are.  According to Desmond 
Morris (1969), this is why many manufacturers produce and 
market products that are cheap imitations of more expensive 
and more exclusive products.  This is also why fashion 
changes so rapidly in the modern industrial world.  The truly 
elite must have something exclusive -- it is how they display 
their elite status.  Otherwise, if everyone dressed alike, and 
lived in the same type abodes, and acted basically the same, 
then status differential would be impossible to recognize.  In 
industrial nations where fashion mimicry is part of an 
industry, in order to exhibit dominance, fashions must 
continually change.  Status imitators, by copying fashions, 
effectively erase the difference between authentic upper 
class members, who really are rich, and lower class members 
who are always one step behind with their status mimicry.  
True class identity can change as a function of economic 
mobility.  But this is possible only in societies that allow 
such mobility.  In many traditional societies, caste, as a 
primary characteristic of identity, can never change no 
matter what kind of job one does or what kinds of material 
positions one has.  In fact, caste dictates what kinds of jobs 
and positions one is allowed to occupy. 
 So, primary characteristics are immutable while 
secondary characteristics are mutable.  Traditional societies 
tend to see the individual as being much more predetermined 
and immutable, born into a tribe, caste and gender, which 
have very rigid identities and expectations about the person’s 
role in society (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961).  There is a 
kind of security in traditional societies in that the individual 
is not held responsible for his or her lot in life and therefore 
cannot be blamed for failing to create great 
accomplishments.  Modern democratized societies tend to be 
much more individualistic, expecting people to willfully 
strive to change their status through merit (Hofstede, 1983).  
While pre-modern traditional social structures have strict 
expectations for individual group members, in the modern 
world the individual tends to stand alone, and bear the 
responsibility for whatever achievements he may or may not 
accomplish. 
Urban and Rural Selves 
 This difference between seeing the social agent as 
immutable on one hand (as in the Indian caste system) and 
mutable on the other hand (as in current Canadian society) is 
closely related with the tendency of societies to favor either 
collectivistic or individualistic styles of living (Hofstede, 
1983).  It also is related to the emergence of the split between 
rural and urban culture (Tönnies, 1887 Ger./2001 Eng.; 
Durkheim, 1972; Parsons, 1960; 1968; Smelser, 1992; 
MacIver, 1970). Ferdinand Tönnies claims that there are 
fundamentally two different kinds of social cultures: rural 
gemeinschaft type community and urban gesellschaft type 
society. The difference is similar to that between an 
authentic community where people know each other and 
care about each other and the modern city, which is 
populated by strangers who are rather disinterested in each 
other.  Rural communities typically exhibit close solidarity 
among the inhabitants (gemeinschaft), while urban societies 
tend to exhibit heterogeneity and complex divisions of labor.  
The urban gesellschaft type of social organization is typified 
by a more fragmented aggregation of individualists than the 
smaller gemeinschaft community (Gebser, 1949 Ger./1985 
Eng.).   
 Gesellschaft Urban Culture. Urban culture is associated 
with large populations of people that may represent many 
different kinds of religions, races, languages, values, and 
norms.  People are organized to achieve instrumental goals.  
By contrast, social order in traditional communities is 
organic, not preplanned with a separate goal in mind.  Rural 
life tends to be less linear and more process oriented while 
modern urban life is progressive and goal oriented.  In the 
gesellschaft world, people are brought together to perform 
functions as when a corporation hires strangers from various 
fields such as engineers, secretaries, accountants, sales 
personnel, attorneys, and so forth to come together as a 
fabricated team to work for a common prefabricated goal.  It 
is in the heterogeneity of the city that the stranger comes into 
being.  In fact, while a tribal person may spend his or her 
entire life in the presence of extended family or clan and so 
have very intimate knowledge of them, in the city, a person 
spends most of their life in the presence of huge crowds of 
absolute strangers (Simmel, 1908 Ger./1950 Eng.; 1903; 
1890).  
 Gemeinschaft Rural Community. A common value 
system binds members together in the gemeinschaft 
community while legalistic contractual agreement keeps the 
members of urban society organized.  Individualism is 
exaggerated by the isolation of persons in the urban world.  
Individualistic societies tend to see the individual as 
responsible, free, but also very often alienated.  The style of 
communication in such societies tends to be what Edward T. 
Hall (1966) calls low context communication.  Hall claims 
that there is a dimension of context that affects 
communication style.  In high context communication, 
meaning is presumed by the speakers.  Much meaning is 
taken from the context within which a person is speaking.  In 
low context communication, by contrast, little meaning is 
assumed to be in the context.  While high context situations 
require little verbal elaboration, low context situations 
require more elaborate messages to convey the meaning of 
the situation (Bernstein, 1966).  Thus cosmopolitan urban 
people, who are strangers to each other and do not share a 
great deal of experience, must talk more in order to 
communicate than rural people who know each other well 
and share their lives.   
Two Kinds of Decision Making 
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 People in small collectives like tribal villages share 
common values so that they tend to be less argumentative in 
their style of communication than western and westernized 
big city dwellers (Ting-Toomey, 1985).  In fact, while 
people from individualistic, low-context cultures see conflict 
as a useful tool of communication, people from 
collectivistic, high context cultures see conflict as an 
emotional expression that causes stress.  Thus, individualists 
tend to have a more confrontational style than people from 
collectivistic cultures who value harmony over individual 
expression.  They even argue in different ways.  People from 
low-context cultures tend to use fact and also argue from 
principle (inductive and deductive reasoning) while high-
context persons tend to use emotion and intuition more 
(Glenn, Witmeyer, and Stevenson, 1977).   
 Villagers tend to stress harmony and protracted 
negotiation over argumentation and quick judgment.  
Community style communication in high-context cultures 
tends to involve consensus building rather than deliberative 
defeat (Condon and Kurata, 1973).  Consensus and 
harmonizing leaves no one out of the decision-making 
process, but it takes time compared to modern urban 
resolution.  Time is a rare commodity in modern urban 
industrial societies.  Modern cosmopolitan culture, which 
tends to be low-context in nature, claims to be “democratic” 
which means disputative.  Debate is a valued mode of 
communication.  Under this style of decision making, once 
a vote is taken, the losing side has little recourse but to be 
quiet and follow the will of the majority.  Furthermore, 
modern society is complex, with many divisions of labor.  
Hierarchy and management of complex processes often 
leads to decision-making occurring among a few managers 
who set goals for the organization and decide how those 
goals should be pursued. 
 The classical Greek style of democratic decision-
making, which has become the norm in Western cultures, is 
more efficient than non-Western styles of consensus 
building.  In the Western style, debate occurs for a limited 
amount of time.  Then everyone stops talking and they vote.  
After the vote is taken there may be no more discussion and 
the group moves on to “new business.”  This style was 
refined in Robert’s Rules of Order, which modern 
organizations around the world now follow.  After the vote 
is taken the minority has little chance to change events.   
 But in non-Western democratic decision-making, the 
communication style is not fragmented.  Discussion 
continues until a consensus emerges.  This often takes a lot 
of time, convincing, and compromise.  But in the end, 
compromise prevents some of the group members from 
becoming powerless minorities, which happens in Western 
style decision-making.  So, while Western style decision-
making is quick and final (progressive), nonwestern styles 
tend to be more harmonious and ambiguous, open for 
“further discussion.”  Tribal people may well return to the 
same dispute many times.  Individualistic gesellschaft type 
communication values speed over group harmony, results 
over process (Gebser, 1985; Kramer, 1997).  In fact, Western 
culture is obsessed with the measurement of results rather 
than being interested in the means of achieving those results.  
Satisfaction in “verb cultures” which are collectivistic, 
high-context, and exhibit a gemeinschaft attitude comes 
from the doing of a behavior.  Satisfaction in “noun 
cultures” which are individualistic, low-context, with a 
gesellschaft attitude, comes from measuring and otherwise 
inspecting and enjoying finished results. Western culture 
tends to prize the completion of events rather than the 
process involved.  They work hard to shorten the process as 
much as possible (efficiency).  When one compares means 
to ends, Western cultures tend to be ends oriented while 
nonwestern cultures tend to be means oriented.  John Lennon 
coined a now common phrase that captures the difference: 
“Life is what happens while you are busy making plans.”  
 Individualism and Collectivism 
 In their daily conversations, people in individualistic 
cultures tend to talk more per unit of time than members of 
highly collectivistic cultures.  But members of highly 
collectivistic culture spend more time overall in casual 
conversation.  In collectivistic cultures, members share a 
more homogeneous reality so that more can be assumed than 
in highly complex urban cultures that are very 
heterogeneous, have greater divisions of labor and experts 
who do not “speak the same language.”  In high-context 
cultures communication tends to be more pres-cripted and 
formal, as in the exchange of the meshi or business card in 
Japan.  In this way the awkwardness of not knowing the 
stranger can be avoided by exchanging essential information 
about their identity and thus reduce uncertainty and the 
anxiety that can accompany it (Herman and Schield, 1961; 
Ball-Rokeach, 1973; Miller and Steinberg, 1975; Berger and 
Calabrese, 1975; Gudykunst, 1988). 
 
